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Disability insurance (DI) beneficiaries lose part or all of their benefits if earnings
exceed certain thresholds (“cash-cliffs”). This implicit taxation is considered the
prime reason for the low number of beneficiaries who expand work and reduce
benefit receipt. We analyse a conditional cash programme that incentivises work
related reductions of disability benefits in Switzerland. Four thousand
DI beneficiaries received an offer to claim up to CHF 72,000 (USD 77,000) if
they expand work and reduce benefits. Initial reactions to the programme
announcement, measured by call-back rates, are modest. By the end of the field
phase, the take-up rate is only 0.5 %.
Keywords: Disability insurance; Field experiment; Financial incentive; Return-to-work
JEL classification: H55; J14; C93; D041 Introduction
The high number of disability insurance (DI) recipients — about 6 % of the working-
age population of OECD countries received disability benefits in 2007 — generates
high costs to society. In 2007, OECD countries spent on average 1.2 % of their GDP
on DI benefits, which is almost 2.5 times higher than the fraction of GDP spent on un-
employment benefits. Only 1-2 % of DI recipients exit from DI receipt into employ-
ment per year (OECD, 2003; 2009; 2010). Work disincentives are frequently cited as a
reason for low exit rates from DI receipt into employment (OECD, 2010): In most
countries, DI recipients lose either all or part of their benefits if their earnings exceed
certain thresholds (“cash-cliffs”). Many countries thus plan to reform their DI systems
to remove these work disincentives.
However, there is little empirical evidence on the effectiveness of DI reforms
that provide stronger work incentives for DI recipients.1 Campolieti and Riddell
(2012) evaluate a change in the “earnings disregard”, which is the amount of earn-
ings that DI recipients are allowed to receive without losing their benefits. Kostøl
and Mogstad (2014) as well as Weathers and Hemmeter (2011) evaluate the intro-
duction of a gradual reduction in benefits when people take up or expand work,
and Gettens (2009) analyses the effect of expanding health insurance coverage to2015 Bütler et al. Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
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icies increased employment, none of them affected exit rates from DI receipt into
employment. To our knowledge, no study so far examines conditional cash
incentives that are paid out if DI beneficiaries extend their labour supply and thus
reduce their benefit receipt.
This paper complements the literature on results of a field experiment in
Switzerland. To stimulate employment and benefit reduction, the DI system offered
a conditional cash transfer (“seed capital”) to 4,000 randomly selected DI benefi-
ciaries. The cash-transfer is a lump-sum payment, which is granted to individuals
who extend their labour supply and reduce benefit receipt by a specified amount.
Individuals in this setting have to solve a dynamic optimisation problem. They have
to consider a trade off between a flow of DI benefits against a flow of earnings
and a fixed one-time cash transfer.
The seed capital programme differs in two ways from previous programmes:
First, eligibility depends directly on employment outcomes and benefit reduction.
Individuals can only claim seed capital if they take up or expand employment
and if, as a consequence, their DI benefits decrease by at least one quarter.2 Sec-
ond, the financial incentive is large compared to incentives in previously studied
programmes. Individuals receive a payment of 18,000 Swiss francs (CHF) in the
high treatment condition or CHF 9,000 in the low treatment condition for a re-
duction of DI benefits by one quarter. The maximum payment to an individual
with a full DI pension who completely terminates DI receipt amounts to CHF
72,000 (about USD 77,000 at the time of the introduction of the programme in
September 2010). This amount is comparable to the average disposable yearly in-
come of Swiss households (FSO, 2007). In addition, the lump-sum payment
enjoys preferential tax treatment.
We use a simple labour supply model to simulate expected responses to seed
capital. For a majority of individuals, extending labour supply for a period of more
than two years would not have been beneficial. Significantly increased take-up rates
of 50 % and higher can be expected for individuals with work disincentives. These
are individuals who would lose a substantial amount of their benefits if they in-
creased work hours and thus earnings by a small amount (“cash-cliff constrained”
individuals).
What can we conclude from this experiment on the role of financial work incen-
tives and cash-cliff constraints? In the aggregate, the programme did not succeed:
By the end of the experiment (September 2010–August 2013), only 20 individuals
or 0.5 % of the experimental sample took up seed capital.3 We investigate the
short-term responses to the announcement of seed capital using data on call-backs
of DI beneficiaries who asked for further information about seed capital. We find
that the size of the financial incentives does not affect response rates. Both in the
high and the low treatment group, only about 4 % of individuals contacted their
case worker for more information. We find that cash-cliffs play a role, but the re-
actions of cash-cliff constrained individuals fall far behind the model predictions.
More specifically, call-back rates of cash-cliff constrained individuals are only 3 to
4 percentage points higher, compared to the call-back rates of individuals who are
not cash-cliff constrained.
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viduals from contacting their DI office and from taking up the programme. One
potential explanation is that the complexity of the Swiss DI system made it diffi-
cult for DI beneficiaries to understand the incentives involved and, as a conse-
quence, many beneficiaries decided not to participate in the programme. Another
explanation is that the seed capital offer was not very attractive for risk-averse
beneficiaries because it required them to weigh giving up guaranteed DI benefits
against a possibly higher, but uncertain labour income. Consistent with this latter
explanation, we find that DI beneficiaries whose benefits would have been termi-
nated by taking up seed capital (and with it the possibility of receiving means-
tested benefits) were significantly less likely to call back and to schedule a meeting
with their case worker.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides a description of the disability
insurance system in Switzerland and discusses the design of the experiment.
Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 outlines the expected impact in a standard
labour supply model and presents simulation results of the programme effects.
Section 5 summarises the results, followed by a discussion in Section 6. Section 7
concludes.
2 The Swiss disability insurance system and the experimental design
2.1 Institutional setting
The Swiss DI programme provides disability coverage to all individuals below the
full retirement age who have accumulated at least three contribution years. The
programme is part of the broader social insurance system and is mainly financed
through a payroll tax on earned income. A disability award is made if an individ-
ual’s disability degree exceeds 40 % due to health impairment. The disability degree
corresponds to the percentage loss in earnings potential relative to the earnings
potential prior to disability onset.
If a disability award is made, an individual receives a disability pension from the first pil-
lar, which is a pay-as-you-go system aimed at guaranteeing a basic standard of living. The
level of the first pillar pension is an increasing function in the number of contribution
years, average lifetime earnings, and the number of dependent children. Individuals who
contributed to the second pillar prior to disability onset automatically receive a disability
pension from the second pillar if they have been awarded a disability pension from the first
pillar. The second pillar is an employer-based, fully funded occupational pension scheme,
which is mandatory for all employees whose annual earnings exceed CHF 20,000. The net
replacement rate of the first two pillars amounts to 60-80 % and can reach 100 % for bene-
ficiaries with dependent children. DI beneficiaries may claim means-tested supplemental
benefits if the combined income from the two pillars is not sufficient to cover basic needs.
These benefits guarantee an income of CHF 3,000 per month for singles and CHF 4,500
per month for couples.
The Swiss DI programme allows for partial DI pensions, which are a nonlinear
function of the disability degree.4 Specifically, an individual with a disability degree
of 70 % or higher qualifies for a total disability pension. Recipients with a disability
degree of 60-69 % receive a three-quarter pension equal to 75 % of a total pension,
recipients with a disability degree of 50-59 % receive a semi pension equal to 50 %
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quarter pension equal to 25 % of a total pension.
In contrast, the amount a recipient is allowed to earn while still receiving benefits is a lin-
ear function of the disability degree. Specifically, an individual with a disability degree of
X % is allowed to earn (100-X) % of his/her pre-disability earnings. DI beneficiaries are re-
quired to inform the DI office if their employment status or earnings change. If the new
earnings are above the allowed threshold, examiners at the local DI office re-examine the
health status of the claimant and determine a new disability degree. First and second pillar
pensions are then adjusted according to the new disability degree. Benefits are terminated
if the new disability degree is below 40 %.
Figure 1 shows the total income, i.e., the sum of earnings and first and second pillar DI
pensions, as a function of earnings for a representative (single) DI beneficiary with pre-
disability earnings of CHF 70,000. As the Figure illustrates, there are discontinuous drops
in total income at earnings thresholds where DI pensions are reduced or terminated
entirely. These notches in the budget constraint induce a high implicit tax on work and
create an incentive to keep earnings below the threshold level in order to retain benefits.5
The field experiment, described in detail in the next section, tests one potential avenue to
reduce these work disincentives.2.2 Experiment “Pilot Project Seed Capital”
To measure the effect of financial work incentives, the Swiss Federal Social Insurance
Office (henceforth “FSIO”) conducted a field experiment (“Pilot Project Seed Capital”).6
Seed capital is a conditional lump-sum payment for DI recipients who meet two
requirements: First, they have to take up or expand work in the primary labour market.
















Earnings 1st pillar 2nd pillar
Fig. 1 Budget constraint of a representative DI beneficiary. Note: Figure 1 shows total income of a single
DI beneficiary with an earnings potential prior to disability onset of CHF 70,000. The x-axis shows annual
earnings in the first labour market in CHF. The y-axis shows total annual income (the sum of earnings, 1st
pillar benefits, and 2nd pillar benefits) in CHF
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fall-back rule accommodates potential deterioration in health status: Within five
years after the pension reduction, individuals can fall back to their old DI contract
if they cannot work for 30 consecutive days.
Two different treatments were implemented: DI beneficiaries in the “high” seed
capital treatment receive CHF 18,000 for each pension reduction by one quarter,
while beneficiaries in the “low” seed capital treatment receive CHF 9,000 for each
pension reduction by one quarter. Thus, a DI beneficiary with a full pension who
completely exits the DI programme receives CHF 72,000 in the high seed capital
treatment and CHF 36,000 in the low seed capital treatment. The former amount
is comparable to the average income of a Swiss household, while the latter amount
corresponds to the minimum yearly income guaranteed by means-tested benefits.
The lump-sum payment is split into four equal tranches, paid bi-annually over two
years. Once an individual falls back to a higher pension, the DI system stops the
payment of outstanding seed capital tranches. Already paid tranches do not have
to be reimbursed.
Two cantons (these are the member states of Switzerland) participated in the field ex-
periment: St. Gallen, a German-speaking canton, and Vaud, a French-speaking canton.
Out of the 37,853 DI recipients in these two cantons, 6,020 individuals were randomly
chosen for the two treatments (2,000 individuals each) and for the control group (2,020
individuals). Table 3 in the appendix provides details on the stratified assignment
mechanism.
The field phase of the experiment took place between September 2010 and
August 2013. In September 2010, a letter from the local DI office informed the
treated individuals about seed capital eligibility. This letter explained the eligibility
rules as well as the fall-back rule mentioned above. Furthermore, the letter encour-
aged participants to contact their DI case worker for further information and as-
sistance. The exact wording of the letter is provided in the Additional file 1 to this
paper. The control group did not receive any information. After contacting the DI
office by phone, individuals could meet their DI case workers in person to discuss
the next steps.
3 Data
To choose programme participants and to simulate programme effects, we combine
administrative data from the Swiss pension system (first pillar) with baseline survey
data. Both datasets cover the pre-programme period. The administrative data include
all DI recipients in the participating cantons and contain full labour market histories,
demographic characteristics, and information on first-pillar pensions. However, infor-
mation on further income sources such as second pillar and means-tested benefits is
not recorded. To enrich the administrative database, we conducted a telephone survey
among 8,000 randomly selected individuals prior to the programme announcement (re-
sponse rate: 51 %). The survey data include current employment, detailed information
on all possible sources of income (i.e., wages, work hours, second pillar benefits,
means-tested benefits, partner’s income), further demographic characteristics (e.g.,
marital status, number of children, and education), and information on work capacity
(e.g., health status, perceived difficulty to find a job).
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worker records on all interactions with DI beneficiaries in the treatment groups,
starting at the time of the programme announcement. No data on the contact with
control group members are available. From personal communication with the local
DI offices, however, we learned that contact with DI beneficiaries outside the
standard re-assessment process (which occurs every two or three years) is typically
rare. Case worker reports consist of the date, the frequency, and the content of all
interactions that took place both over the phone and in person, for up to five
months after the programme announcement (i.e., between September 2010 and
February 2011). About 8 % of all individuals in the treatment group contacted the
local DI office.
As interest in take-up of seed capital during the first five months of the experi-
ment fell far behind the FSIO’s expectations, the FSIO refrained from further
data collection and delivery. By contacting the local DI offices we learned that 20
individuals or 0.5 % of the treatment group took up seed capital during the
field phase (September 2010—August 2013). However, with a take-up rate of
only 0.5 %, studying long-term outcomes other than DI take-up is unlikely to be
meaningful.
The low take-up seems surprising at first sight, as many individuals display
considerable work capacity (see Table 4 in the appendix). For example, 30 % of in-
dividuals report good or very good health, and 18 % report no difficulty in finding
employment. Moreover, 52 % of individuals suffer from mental diseases, which
might only temporarily impair health, at least for some individuals. Section 4
presents a model for the financial incentives, and a simulation of expected
programme effects.
4 A stylised model and predicted effects of seed capital
4.1 A stylised model for the effect of seed capital
We illustrate the basic economic forces at work in a simple static model where in-
dividuals maximise utility over consumption ( c ) and leisure ( l ). We assume that
the relative value of leisure increases with an individual’s health impairment. To
create a tractable model, we introduce two short-cuts: first, the model assumes a
single level of pension benefits and thus a single notch. Hence, the model simpli-
fies the Swiss scheme, which contains multiple notches (see Fig. 1). Second, we as-
sume that individuals are able to work and that they are able to perfectly mimic
their preferred level of work capacity by choosing their number of work hours.
This assumption creates a direct mapping from work hours into disability benefits:
individuals receive disability insurance benefits ( b ) if hours of work (L ¼ T  l ,
where T denotes the maximum time available for either leisure activities or work)
fall below a certain threshold (τ). DI beneficiaries receive seed capital (s) if they ex-
pand work beyond the threshold and thus lose DI benefits.
Our model is static and compares a situation without seed capital (s ¼ 0) to a situation
with seed capital (s > 0).7 In the absence of seed capital, we expect three types of DI benefi-
ciaries: The first two types choose boundary solutions, that is, they either choose not to
work at all (type 1) or to work exactly at the “cash cliff” that determines the next lower
benefit level (type 2). While individuals choosing the former may have either very high
Bütler et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:18 Page 7 of 18disutility of work or low wages (both may reflect the consequences of a disability), individ-
uals choosing the latter would work more if they did not lose disability benefits. The
remaining individuals choose employment at the interior solution with the optimal level of
hours of work to the left of the cash-cliff (type 3).
In the seed capital scenario, DI beneficiaries receive a lump-sum payment if they increase
hours of work and lose DI benefits. Two different situations can occur (Fig. 2): (1) seed
capital does not fully (or just) compensate for the benefit loss (left panel), or (2) seed capital
overcompensates for the benefit loss (right panel). In the first case, only individuals who
would have chosen their hours of work exactly at the notch in the absence of seed capital
(type 2) change their behaviour. However, they only change their behaviour if additional
earnings and seed capital together compensate for the loss in benefits and for the higher
disutility caused by employment. In other words, total income (earnings, seed capital, and
DI benefits) after expanding employment must be strictly higher than total income in the
status quo. For all other beneficiaries the optimal decision remains unchanged (compared
to a situation without seed capital). In the second case, i.e., when seed capital overcompen-
sates for the benefit loss, there would also be an increase in hours of work among benefi-
ciaries who choose hours of work below the notch in a world without seed capital. These
individuals, however, increase working hours only to the notch point so that they “just”
meet the condition for receiving seed capital.
The simple model also demonstrates the limits of financial incentives: seed capital
increases employment and reduces DI benefits for type 1 and type 3 beneficiaries only if
they are overcompensated for the benefit loss. This implies that the savings in DI benefits
due to the intervention are less than the seed capital payments, which cannot be a cost-






























Overcompensation: s > b
cash-cliff
threshold
Fig. 2 Labor-consumption trade-off. Note: The two panels show labor supply choices in a stylized model under
two conditions, for three types of individuals. Left panel: Seed capital does not compensate benefit losses. Right
panel: Seed capital overcompensates benefit losses. Notation: s: amount of seed capital, b: loss of benefits if an
individual extends his/her earnings beyond a certain cash-cliff threshold. Wages are denoted w. The budget
constraint is C=wL+ b if work hours L are below the cash-cliff threshold (L≤ τ) and C=wL+ s if individuals
expand their work hours beyond the cash-cliff threshold and claim seed capital
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This section presents micro-simulation results on the predicted effect of seed
capital based on the simple labour supply model described in the previous sec-
tion. Here, we model the necessary return-to-work condition based on the budget
constraint for different types rather than fully specify the utility functions: Type 1
and 3 beneficiaries will only react to seed capital if they are overcompensated for
the benefit loss. Type 2 beneficiaries do not need to be overcompensated, but
their additional earnings and seed capital together need to at least compensate
for the loss in benefits. We use available survey and administrative data to deter-
mine the type, as well as their expected gains and losses from taking up seed
capital.
We model three different “return-to-work” scenarios (henceforth, we use “return-
to-work” as a collective term for both “extension of working hours” and “take-up
of work”): first, we assume a return-to-work period of two years, where individuals
fall back to their old DI contracts after they receive the last payment tranche. (DI
beneficiaries had the legal possibility to return to their old DI contracts when they
were unable to work for 30 consecutive days within the first five years after reinte-
gration.) Yet, at the time of the experiment, a lively political debate on future re-
forms of the Swiss DI system took place, particularly on how to enforce
reintegration of current DI beneficiaries. DI recipients may thus have feared that
they could not easily fall back into their old contract after two years. Therefore,
the second scenario assumes that individuals increase employment for a period of
five years and fall back to their old disability degree thereafter (but not into their
old DI contract, see further explanations below). The third scenario assumes that
individuals increase employment until retirement and do not fall back to their old
disability degree.
We assume that individuals increase employment exactly to the next cash-cliff
threshold. Our data contain current earnings and the disability degree for all work-
ing individuals. Cash-cliff thresholds, however, are a function of unobserved poten-
tial earnings (see Section 2). To construct cash-cliff thresholds, we assume that an
individual’s current employment level corresponds exactly to his/her disability de-
gree. In other words, if a beneficiary had an initial disability degree of 50 % and
takes up seed capital, his/her employment level increases to 60 %, and his/her dis-
ability degree declines to 40 %. This implies that his/her current earnings increase
by 20 %. For individuals who are currently not working, we predict earnings when
taking up employment based on information for individuals who are comparable in
terms of observable characteristics, but who are working (see the Additional file 1
to this paper for more details).
During the return-to-work period, increased earnings lead to a reduction in first
and second pillar benefits by one quarter. We also re-calculate means-tested bene-
fits, as these depend on earnings and on first and second pillar benefits. In the
scenario of return-to-work, for two years beneficiaries fall back into their old DI
contract after the return-to-work period ends. Hence, compared to the status quo,
DI benefits decline during the return-to-work period, but afterwards they pick up
the status quo path again. This is not the case when the return-to-work period is
five years and longer. Here, the DI re-calculates benefits even if individuals fall
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old-age benefits. We provide a detailed description of the simulation in the Additional
file 1 to this paper.
Based on the micro-simulation, we estimate necessary return-to-work conditions for
different types of individuals. We cannot directly observe types, but we assess types
based on observed disability degrees and labour market behaviour prior to programme
announcement: Type 1 are individuals who do not work at all, irrespective of their dis-
ability degree (65 % of our sample); type 2 are cash-cliff constrained individuals, that is,
individuals who work and have a disability degree exactly at the threshold (12 % of our
sample); and type 3 are individuals who work and have a disability degree not at the
threshold (23 % of our sample).
Table 1 presents the simulation results. We estimate that in the return-to-work
(RTW) for 2 years scenario 14 % of beneficiaries would react to low seed capital
(CHF 9,000) and almost 49 % of beneficiaries would respond to high seed capital.
The share of beneficiaries who would respond to seed capital is much lower for
longer return-to-work periods. For example, we find that only 6 % (8 %) of benefi-
ciaries would respond to low (high) seed capital in the return-to-work until retire-
ment scenario. In all scenarios, cash-cliff constrained beneficiaries (type 2) are
more responsive to seed capital than non-cash-cliff constrained beneficiaries (types
1 and 3). In sum, based on the simulation results, we expect that seed capital is
likely to trigger a short-run response but is unlikely to have a long-run impact.
However, even the short-run response may be small if beneficiaries fear that they
cannot return to their old DI contracts after two years. Such fears may have been
reinforced by the intense debates about reforming the DI system that took place at
the time of the experiment.
5 Results of the pilot project
Overall, our results document a low interest in the programme. Only 20 treated
individuals (0.5 %) took up seed capital within three years after sending out the
offer. The take-up rate corresponds approximately to the overall rate of pension
reductions due to increased earnings in previous years.8 It is thus very likely thatTable 1 Necessary return-to-work condition for alternative scenarios
Type 1 Type 3 Type 2 Total
Labour market status Not working Working Working
Disability degree Any Not at the notch At the notch
% of population 65 % 23 % 12 %
Return-to-work condition Seed capital > benefit loss
during return-to-work
Seed capital > total
income change
Percentage where return-to-work condition is fulfilled (9,000/18,000 CHF)
RTW for 2 years 7 %/41 % 11 %/58 % 61 %/75 % 14 %/49 %
RTW for 5 years 0 %/5 % 2 %/7 % 53 %/58 % 7 %/12 %
RTW until retirement 0 %/2 % 2 %/2 % 47 %/51 % 6 %/8 %
Note: The simulation is based on information from 2,273 individuals in the treatment and control group who participated
in the survey and have non-missing information on wages and benefit payments. Individuals who had never worked before
DI entry were excluded because wage predictions are based on work history prior to DI entry. RTW: Return-to-work. RTW also
includes individuals who are already working, but extend their work hours. Details on the simulation can be found in the
Additional file 1 to this paper
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creased employment and reduced their DI benefits anyway. Yet, seed capital does
not seem to incentivise take-up or expansion of employment among marginal
recipients.
Since we cannot link final take-up rates to administrative data sources, all further
analysis will be based on short-term reactions. In total about 8 % of all individuals
in the treated groups contacted their local DI offices within the first five months
after the programme announcement. However, only 4 % of individuals asked for in-
formation about the programme (see Table 4 in the appendix). Table 2 investigates
the factors that predict whether individuals called their case worker to ask for in-
formation about the programme or whether they even scheduled a meeting to dis-
cuss further steps to take up seed capital. Call-back rates and scheduled meetings
positively correlate with work capacity: Individuals who were never employed, as
well as older individuals, react less frequently. Moreover, work disincentives play a
role: individuals with quarter pensions, who would in many cases lose their means
tested benefits in addition to their disability pension, react less frequently as well.
In addition, foreigners tend to call or schedule a meeting more frequently. These
individuals may seek additional information as they may be less familiar with the
Swiss system or with the language of the announcement letter (French or German).
The size of the seed capital payment, however, does not play a role. The coefficient
on high seed capital is close to zero for call-back rates and insignificant for
scheduled meetings.
Figure 3 further investigates the role of cash-cliffs. The upper two panels present histo-
grams of disability degrees prior to the experiment. We include only survey participants
with information on work status, as this allows us to distinguish between beneficiaries who
are working at the time of the experiment (N = 760, upper left panel) and beneficiaries who
are not working (N = 1,442, upper right panel). There is clear bunching at disability degrees
where DI benefits discontinuously increase (40 %, 50 %, 60 %, and 70 %), both for individ-
uals who are working at the time of the experiment and, to a lesser extent, for individuals
who have never worked before the experiment. Bunching not only occurs at cash-cliffs, but
also at decimal numbers that are unrelated to cash-cliffs (e.g., 80 % and 90 %). While
bunching at cash-cliffs for DI recipients who are working may result from work disincen-
tives, bunching for DI recipients who are not working may rather emerge from rule-of-
thumb assessments of case workers.
The lower two panels display reactions to the seed capital announcement, measured as
call-back rates at the DI offices. For individuals who are currently working, we observe
higher call-back rates at the cash-cliffs, or just above the cash-cliffs; this pattern is in line
with work disincentives at cash-cliffs. For individuals who are not working, we do not ob-
serve such a clear pattern. On the contrary, individuals just below the cut-off react more
frequently. This pattern is consistent with the absence of work disincentives at the cash-
cliff among this group.
6 Why the low take-up rates?
Our results show that seed capital was not successful in increasing return-to-work among
DI beneficiaries, and a natural question is why the interest in seed capital was so low. We
discuss three possible explanations for this finding. First, we discuss whether our
Table 2 Predictors of call-back rate and scheduled meeting
(1) Call-back (2) Call-back (3) Meeting
Coeff. (S.E.) Coeff. (S.E.) Coeff. (S.E.)
Treatment (=1 if seed capital: high) −0.002 0.012 −0.002 0.013 0.013 0.013
Age −0.007* 0.004 −0.004 0.004 −0.009* 0.005
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sex (=1 if male) 0.007 0.011 0.007 0.012 0.025* 0.014
Foreign (= 1 if foreign) 0.027* 0.015 0.046** 0.022 0.058** 0.027
Civil status (ref.: married)
Single or widow 0.024 0.016 0.013 0.019 0.009 0.015
Separated or divorced 0.017 0.017 0.013 0.020 0.041 0.028
Child (= 1 if at least 1 child) 0.024 0.017 0.013 0.017 0.016 0.022
Disease (ref.: Mental)
Nervous system −0.031 0.019 −0.020 0.013 −0.008 0.013
Back disorders −0.003 0.022 0.016 0.022 0.005 0.023
Other musculoskeletal diseases −0.024 0.019 0.011 0.024 0.012 0.025
Injuries −0.005 0.023 0.021 0.026 0.015 0.039
Other 0.006 0.020 0.007 0.020 −0.007 0.020
Pension (ref.: half)
Full 0.017 0.016 −0.003 0.021 0.017 0.023
Three quarters −0.029 0.018 −0.030 0.022 −0.003 0.026
One quarter −0.044*** 0.015 −0.055*** 0.018 −0.018 0.018
Start of pension receipt (ref.: 2001 - 2006)
Before 1996 0.008 0.015 −0.015 0.015 0.003 0.019
1996 – 2000 0.023 0.016 0.006 0.018 0.009 0.021
After 2006 0.013 0.017 0.011 0.022 −0.012 0.023
Education (ref.: high school/vocational)
Compulsory education or less −0.011 0.015 −0.015 0.017
Higher vocational degree 0.013 0.023 0.022 0.026
Self-reported health (ref.: not so good)
Good/very good 0.013 0.016 0.007 0.016
Bad −0.002 0.015 0.022 0.021
Employment (ref.: previously employed)
Currently employed 0.004 0.016 0.031 0.019
Never employed −0.038*** 0.010 −0.032** 0.014
Job search (ref.: difficult)
Easy 0.008 0.038 0.040 0.049
Almost impossible −0.024 0.016 −0.004 0.015
Missing −0.017 0.029 0.011 0.033
Survey participation (= 1 if participates) −0.016 0.012
Adjusted R2 0.013 0.016 0.047
Number of observations 4,000 2,297 1,260
Note: The table shows OLS estimates for the experimental sample (column 1), for survey participants (column 2), and for
individuals in the canton of Vaud who participated in the survey (column 3). The outcome variables are an indicator for
interest in seed capital, measured as case-worker contact with request for more information (columns 1 and 2) and an
indicator for whether a meeting with the case worker was scheduled to discuss further steps (column 3). The regression
coefficients are computed using sampling weights. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05;
***p < 0.01
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Fig. 3 Bunching behavior and responses to seed capital at the cash-cliff. Note: Figure 3 is based on information
from respondents who participated in a survey prior to the pilot project. The left two panels show results for
individuals who were employed prior to the experiment, who provided survey information on earnings, and who
were randomized into one of the treatment groups (N=760). The right panels show results for individuals who
were not employed at the time of the experiment (N=1,442). The upper panels present histograms of disability
degrees with a bin width of one percentage point. The lower panels present interest in seed capital (binary
variable: individual contacts the local disability office and expresses interest). Dots are averages per disability
degree. Source: Own calculations based on administrative and survey data and case worker records, provided by
the Federal Social Insurance Office, Switzerland
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types. Second, we ask whether the complexity of the DI system and information frictions
precluded beneficiaries from understanding the incentives. Third, we discuss whether
beneficiaries did not respond to the incentives because of risk aversion and the way the
seed capital programme was designed.
One possibility for our findings could relate to misclassification of beneficiaries into
types. The correct classification of beneficiaries into types is crucial when estimating the
overall response to seed capital because our simulations suggest that type 2 beneficiaries
should be much more responsive to seed capital than type 1 and type 3 beneficiaries. We
classify all beneficiaries who were employed prior to seed capital and who had disability de-
grees close to a cash-cliff as type 2. Observed bunching at cash-cliffs prior to seed capital
announcement is consistent with labour supply responses to a non-linear budget set, but
Fig. 3 also displays bunching at disability degrees that are not associated with higher DI
benefits (for example, 80 % and 100 %). Clustering of disability degrees at decimal numbers
may therefore also reflect rules of thumb that case workers use in the assessment of disabil-
ity degrees. Consequently, the true proportion of type 2 beneficiaries may be much smaller
than predicted.
Another potential explanation for the low interest in seed capital may be the complexity
of the Swiss DI system. As discussed above, DI beneficiaries typically receive benefits from
several programmes (1st pillar, 2nd pillar, and means-tested benefits), and determining the
Bütler et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:18 Page 13 of 18consequences of return-to-work on each type of benefit is difficult. Moreover, some effects
of return-to-work on benefits only materialise far in the future when individuals reach the
retirement age. Hence, it is likely that DI beneficiaries were not more responsive to seed
capital because they did not fully understand the incentives involved. Support for this claim
is provided by several behavioural economics studies which show that agents tend to avoid
making an active choice when faced with complex decisions in order not to incur large up-
front problem-solving costs (e.g., Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1998; Beshears et al., 2008;
Frank and Lamiraud, 2009). The impact of complexity is likely to be compounded by the
limited information available to DI recipients about the seed capital programme. In par-
ticular, the announcement letter was the only source of information available to DI recipi-
ents, unless they contacted their case worker to ask for additional information (which
occurred in 4 % of all cases). In contrast, when a nationwide pension reform is announced,
DI recipients receive the same information several times through different channels (e.g.,
media, word of mouth, support groups).
A third possible explanation for the low take-up rate is the way that the seed capital
programme was designed. More specifically, the programme tried to achieve two objec-
tives: (1) increase employment and (2) reduce (guaranteed) DI benefits. It is very likely that
many risk averse beneficiaries did not perceive the programme as advantageous as they
would have faced a trade-off of certain DI benefits against a potentially higher, but more
uncertain, work income. Risk aversion could thus significantly harm the expansion of em-
ployment and the take-up of seed capital, particularly for longer return-to-work periods.
Consistent with this explanation, we find that beneficiaries who would have lost DI benefits
(and the possibility to receive means-tested benefits) by taking up seed capital are signifi-
cantly less likely to call back and to schedule a meeting with their case worker.
7 Conclusion
This paper presents the results of a field experiment on financial work incentives for DI re-
cipients in Switzerland. The programme aimed at reducing the loss of DI benefits if earn-
ings exceeded certain thresholds (“cash-cliffs”). The programme granted a lump-sum
payment of up to CHF 72,000 (USD 77,000) if individuals expanded employment and re-
duced their DI benefits.
Using a micro-simulation model, we demonstrate that the amount of money offered,
though large in comparison with other cash programmes, is unlikely to increase employ-
ment in the long-run. Our simulations predict that for most beneficiaries, returning to the
labour market for a period of more than two years would not have been beneficial, even
after accounting for the seed capital offset. However, our simulations suggest that seed cap-
ital should have increased employment at least in the short-run, i.e., in the case of DI bene-
ficiaries returning to the labour market for two years or less.
Yet, we find that the interest in participating in the programme is very low. The overall
take-up rate of seed capital was just 0.5 %. Only 4 % of DI beneficiaries contacted their case
worker within five months after the programme announcement to request more informa-
tion. Doubling the amount of the lump-sum payment made no difference. We find slightly
higher reactions to seed capital for beneficiaries with disability degrees at “cash-cliffs”, who,
according to our model, should be particularly attracted to take up seed capital.
Why was interest in the take-up of seed capital so low? One possibility is that
the complexity of the Swiss DI system made it very difficult for beneficiaries to
Bütler et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:18 Page 14 of 18understand the incentives involved, and, as a consequence, many beneficiaries
decided not to participate in the programme. Thus, simplifying the DI system may
increase the responsiveness of beneficiaries to financial incentives. Another possi-
bility is that the programme was designed poorly. More specifically, to qualify for
seed capital, beneficiaries had to give up certain DI benefits in return for a possibly
higher, but uncertain labour income. It is very likely that risk-averse beneficiaries
did not perceive this offer as advantageous. A programme that would allow benefi-
ciaries to keep their benefits while making a work attempt would probably be more
successful in increasing return-to-work.
Endnotes
1Other types of DI reforms include policies that reduce DI inflow by reducing
benefit generosity, altering eligibility criteria, or implementing stricter screening.
These policies are relatively successful in reducing the number of DI recipients
(e.g., de Jong, Lindeboom, & van der Klaauw, 2011; Staubli, 2011; van Vuren &
van Vuuren, 2007). Policies that aim at increasing DI outflow by providing access
to vocational rehabilitation and employment integration are less effective. Results
indicate low take-up and no or only small effects on outflow (e.g., Adam, Bozio, &
Emmerson, 2010; Stapleton et al., 2008; Thornton et al., 2004; Kornfeld & Rupp,
2000).
2A reduction in DI benefits is thus driven by an increase in labour supply. This is in
contrast to papers that study the labour response to a change in DI benefits (e.g., Autor
& Duggan, 2007; Marie & Vall Castello, 2012; Gruber, 2000; Campolieti, 2004).
3Because of low take-up, the Swiss Social Security Administration terminated the in-
vestigation into seed capital and irrevocably withdrew from further data collection and
provision. Thus, it is not possible to examine outcomes other than take-up such as
earnings, benefits, and disability degrees. However, given the low take-up rates, it is un-
likely that these outcomes changed significantly in the treatment group relative to the
control group.
4Partial DI systems exist in many countries (such as Norway, the Netherlands,
Sweden, or Germany for example).
5The budget constraint of DI recipients who are eligible for means-tested benefits has
fewer notches, as means-tested benefits offset the loss in DI benefits. Figure 4 in the
Appendix illustrates the budget constraint of a representative DI beneficiary who is eli-
gible for means-tested benefits.
6See http://www.bsv.admin.ch/themen/iv/00023/03205/03245/index.html?lang=de for
a detailed description of the programme (in German).
7In the next section, we examine the financial impact of seed capital in a dynamic set-
ting by comparing the stream of DI benefits, earnings, and total income over the life-
span with and without seed capital. The static model presented here is generalisable to
this dynamic setting with the difference that in the dynamic case c captures the net
present value of consumption over the remaining lifespan and T captures the length of
the return-to-work period.
8In the year 2011, for example, about 0.4 % of all DI beneficiaries reduced their pen-
sion by at least one quarter in comparison to the previous year, but kept a pension of
at least one quarter.
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Obs. % full sample Stratified
1) Full sample 37,853 100 % No
2) Invited for survey participation 8,000 21 % Yes
3) Survey participants 4,049 11 % Yes
Nonparticipants 3,951 10 % Yes
4) Experimental sample 6,020 16 % Yes
Seed capital high 2,000 5 % Yes
Seed capital low 2,000 5 % Yes
Control group 2,020 5 % Yes
5) Simulation sample 2,273 6 % Yes
Note: Selection for participation took place in two steps: From the total of 37,853 individuals who were observed in the
administrative records in June 2009, 2,814 individuals have been excluded, primarily as their current residence was
outside of the cantons of St. Gallen and Vaud. From the remaining 35,039 individuals, 8,000 individuals have been
randomly selected to participate in a survey. Random sampling was stratified by three age groups. The experimental
sample consists of all individuals who were invited to participate in the survey but excluded individuals who are likely to
live in a nursing home and individuals with a disabled partner (to avoid spill-over effects if one person gets randomised
into the low and the other person gets randomised into the high seed capital group). The simulation sample consists of
all individuals in the treatment and comparison group who participated in the survey and have non-missing information
on incomes and benefit payments. Individuals who have never worked before DI entry were excluded, because wage
predictions are based on work history prior to disability. Source: Own calculations based on administrative and survey
data, provided by the Federal Office for Social Insurance, Switzerland
Table 4 Descriptive statistics
Observations Mean
Phone call: Positive/neutral reactiona 4,000 0.04
Phone call: Any reactiona 4,000 0.08
Phone call: Only positive reactiona 4,000 0.03
Seed capital: lowa 4,000 0.50
Seed capital: higha 4,000 0.50
Type 1: not workingb 2,297 0.63
Type 2: working at notchb 2,297 0.10
Type 3: working not at notchb 2,297 0.27
Total yearly benefit level (in 1,000 CHF)b 1,813 31.77
Yearly wage (in 1,000 CHF)b 2,202 6.24
Self-reported health: good/very goodc 2,198 0.31
Has any painsc 2,200 0.77
Difficulty: Mobilityc 2,206 0.40
Difficulty: Householdc 2,214 0.60
Difficulty: Self-carec 2,214 0.20
Years in DIc 2,214 0.06




Civil status: Single/widowc 2,214 0.43
Civil status: Marriedc 2,214 0.41
Civil status: Divorced/separatedc 2,214 0.16
Dependent childrenc 2,214 0.37
Disease: Mentalc 2,214 0.52
Disease: Nervous systemc 2,214 0.08
Disease: Back disorders c 2,214 0.06
Disease: Other musculoskeletal diseasesc 2,214 0.09
Disease: Injuriesc 2,214 0.09
Disease: Otherc 2,214 0.16
Start of pension receipt: Before 1996c 2,214 0.22
Start of pension receipt: 1996 - 2000c 2,214 0.25
Start of pension receipt: 2001 - 2006c 2,214 0.36
Start of pension receipt: After 2006c 2,214 0.18
Education: Compulsory education or lessc 2,214 0.35
Education: Vocational degreec 2,214 0.52
Education: High school degreec 2,214 0.04
Education: Higher vocational or collegec 2,214 0.09
The table presents descriptive statistics for the sample of treated individuals or for subgroups with non-missing information
on the respective variables. Samples: aIndividuals in both treatment groups; bIndividuals in treatment groups with survey
response; cIndividuals in sample b with non-missing information on capacity-to-work variables (such as difficulty to find
employment). Source: Own calculations based on administrative data and survey data, provided by the Federal Social
Insurance Office, Switzerland
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Fig. 4 Budget constraint of DI beneficiary with means-tested benefits. Note: Figure 4 shows total income
of a single DI beneficiary with an earnings potential prior to disability onset of CHF 50,000. The x-axis
shows annual earnings in the first labour market in CHF. The y-axis shows total annual income (the sum
of earnings, 1st pillar benefits, 2nd pillar benefits, and means-tested benefits) in CHF
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